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Abstract
Internet search engines display advertisements along with search results, providing them
with a major source of revenue. The display of ads is triggered by the use of keywords, which
are found in the searches performed by search engine users. The fact that advertisers can buy
a keyword that contains a trademark they do not own has caused controversy worldwide. To
explore the actual effects of trademark and keyword advertising policies, we exploit a natural
experiment in Europe. Following a decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union,
Google relaxed its AdWords policy in continental Europe in September 2010. After the policy
change, Google allowed advertisers to select a third party’s trademark as a keyword to trigger
the display of ads, with only a limited complaint procedure for trademark owners. We use
click-stream data from European Internet users to explore the effect this policy change had on
browsing behavior. Based on a dataset of 5.38 million website visits before and after the policy
change, we find little average change. However, we present evidence that this lack of average
effect stems from an aggregation of two opposing effects. While navigational searches are less
likely to lead to the trademark owner’s website, non-navigational searches are more likely to
lead to the trademark owner’s website after the policy change. The effect of changing keyword
advertising policies varies with the purpose of the consumers using the trademark, and it is
more pronounced for lesser-known trademarks. The article points to tradeoffs trademark policy
is facing beyond consumer confusion. More generally, the article proposes a novel way how to
analyze the effect of different allocations of property rights in intellectual property law.
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I Introduction
Since the commercialization of the Internet in the early 1990s, electronic communication
networks have led to significant changes in value chains. Traditionally strong intermediaries
– such as record companies, publishers, newspapers, or movie companies – have been strug-
gling to define their future roles and find profitable business models in a radically changed
environment of content consumption. At the same time, new intermediaries – such as search
engines, auction sites, or social networks – have emerged. In some cases, they threaten to
displace traditional intermediaries. In other cases, they complement them or create entirely
new business models.
In recent years, the discussion on intellectual property rules for intermediaries has in-
creasingly focused on Internet search engines. In particular, a vigorous debate focuses on
whether keyword-based advertising violates trademark law. In Google’s version of the sys-
tem – called Google AdWords – advertisers can buy advertising links in the ‘sponsored links’
section of a Google search results page. Thereby, advertisers purchase the possibility of
having their ad displayed with the search results for a particular keyword that is relevant to
their business. When a Google search user enters a search term which contains a keyword
bought by the advertiser, the ad will appear in the upper right-hand corner or on top of the
search results page. In principle, advertisers are free to select any keyword for their ad. This
becomes a legal issue, however, if an advertiser chooses a keyword that has been registered
as a trademark by another company.
Trademark owners on both sides of the Atlantic have argued that such use of a trademark
as a keyword by a third party violates trademark law and that not only the third party, but
also the intermediary search engine can be held liable based on either primary or secondary
liability doctrines. Google has argued that it should not be liable for trademark infringement
in such cases, as either the third-party keyword registration does not infringe trademark law
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or, even if it did, Google cannot be held liable for such infringement. As Google’s business
model relies extensively on the ad auction mechanism underlying AdWords,1 it has a vital
interest in not becoming involved in trademark-related disputes between trademark owners
and third-party advertisers.
One important dimension to whether third parties should be allowed to register trade-
marks as keywords is the effect such use has on consumer behavior. On the one hand, it
could be that consumers become confused by ads based on third-party keyword registra-
tions, because they assume that such ads originate from or are sponsored by the trademark
owner. One of the policy justifications for trademark protection is to overcome information
asymmetries between product manufacturers or service providers and their customers (Lan-
des and Posner 1987). On the other hand, it could be that consumers realize that an ad
based on a third-party keyword registration is not linked to the trademark owner, and that
they appreciate the increased information and competition resulting from such keyword use.
From a policy perspective, allowing third parties to register trademarked keywords could
increase information availability and transparency in the market place and could therefore
be desirable (Goldman 2009).
To shed light on this tradeoff and determine the effect of third-party keyword advertising
on consumer behavior requires an empirical investigation. Traditionally, evidence on con-
sumer behavior and confusion has been presented in trademark litigation in various forms:
Consumer surveys, evidence of actual confusion, expert witnesses or direct comparison of
trademarks (McCarthy 2014, §23:2:50; Bird and Steckel 2012; Sarel and Marmorstein 2009).
Such evidence reflects the traditionally passive role of the consumer: That she uses the
trademark to distinguish between products or services of different origins.
1Keywords are sold through auctions where advertisers bid competitively against each other for the
position of the ad on the search results page. The mechanisms underlying keyword auctions have been
studied extensively (Edelman et al. 2007; Varian 2007), but are not the focus of this article. Of Google’s
$55.5 billion revenues in 2013, $50.5 billion came from advertising (Google 2014).
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Internet search engines have substantially expanded the role trademarks play in the
consumers’ search processes. First, consumers are now actively using trademarks as they
choose a string of words to query a search engine. They decide whether to use a trademark
alone to search with, or whether to combine it with other words to make the meaning and
use of the trademark more precise. Second, unlike in traditional settings, it is now easy for
firms to monitor the use of trademarks by consumers (Goldfarb 2014).
In this environment of active trademark use by both firms and consumers, more direct
evidence of consumer behavior is of particular interest. While consumer surveys have been
used to measure consumer behavior in the context of keyword advertising (Franklyn and
Hyman 2013),2 and courts have recently begun to explore advanced digital data sources,3 we
propose a novel, more direct and richer way to analyze consumer behavior. We use micro-
level click-stream data on web browsing to directly observe consumer browsing behavior.
Such data has been used before to explore consumer behavior in the context of software
licenses (Bakos et al. 2014); to analyze the effect of illegal music file sharing on legal music
consumption (Aguiar and Martens 2013); to document how often search engine results are
triggered by competitors’ trademarked keywords (Rosso and Jansen 2010); and aggregate
summaries of such data has been used to study the implications of a trademarked search
term in the actual text of search engine ads (Chiou and Tucker 2012). To our knowledge,
our study is the first using this kind of data to explore the relationship between keyword
advertising and trademark law.
After the Court of Justice of the European Union held in March 2010 that Google’s
2On the limited admissibility of survey evidence in keyword advertising cases under U.K. law, see Court
of Appeal, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc., [2012] EWCA Civ 1501, [2013] EWCA Civ 319 (Eng.);
High Court of Justice, [2013] EWHC 1291, para. 210, 223 (Ch.) (Eng.); under U.S. law, see 1-800 Contacts,
Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1246-1247 (10th Cir. 2013).
3Whereas the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has relied on ad impression and click-through
data in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1244 (10th Cir. 2013), the British High Court
of Justice has also utilized eye-tracking studies and aggregate summaries of browsing data, [2013] EWHC
1291 (Ch.) (Eng.).
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AdWords system does not violate European trademark law,4 Google changed its Adwords
policy in various European countries in September 2010. Following this change, Google
allowed third parties to register keywords without the approval of the trademark owner,
with only a limited complaint procedure for trademark owners. We use this exogenous
change in the AdWords policy as a natural experiment to explore the relationship between
keyword advertising and consumer behavior.
We are interested in whether we can observe any visible change in consumer behavior in
click-stream browsing data by comparing web-browsing patterns before and after the Google
AdWords policy change. We use micro-data from 5.38 million records of website visits
following search engine queries that contain a trademark. The data comes from Internet
users in two European countries (France and Germany) and spans the period before and
after the policy change. We compare the changes in browsing behavior on Google, where the
policy change occurred in September 2010, to that on other search engines, where no such
change occurred at that time.
With our micro-data, we are not only able to see whether a consumer used a trademark,
but also how they used that trademark in their search request. Similar to various catego-
rizations developed in previous literature (Goldman 2005; Jansen et al. 2008; Blake et al.
2014), we attempt to distinguish between two kinds of searches:
• Navigational searches, where the consumer is searching for the keyword because she is
directly interested in using the search engine as a shortcut to find a specific web page
such as the trademark owner’s website; and
• Non-navigational searches, where the consumer is using the keyword in some other way,
for example because she is interested in information about the product, in competing
products, compatible components, resellers, alternative distribution channels or third-
4Court of Justice of the EU, Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, Mar. 23, 2010, Joint Cases
C-236/08 to C-238/08, ECR 2010, I-02417. For a more detailed discussion, see Section II.A.
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party after-sale services; she may also be interested in ways to finance the purchase
of the product; she may use the trademark as a substitute for a generic product de-
scription; or she may be very early in the purchase decision process, not being certain
whether she is interested in the trademark owner’s product at all.
We use various ways of distinguishing navigational and non-navigational searches from
the search strings that consumers used in our data. In our data, 20 percent of searches
appear to be purely navigational, while 80 percent appear non-navigational.
It is possible that the effect of the policy change differs between navigational and non-
navigational searches. If a navigational searcher is exposed to ads that contain the trademark
the searcher is looking for, but originate from a third party without authorization of the
trademark owner, this may impede her search process, as her attention is drawn to many
third-party websites in which the searcher is not interested. If, however, a non-navigational
searcher is exposed to such ads, this may improve her ability to progress in her search process,
as she receives more diverse information and this diverse information may encourage her to
visit the trademark owner’s website. As a result, the overall effect of the policy change seems
ambiguous.
We develop various measures to test these predictions. In general, we find that consumers
engaging in navigational searches are less likely to visit the trademark owner’s website after
the policy change. On the other hand, after the policy change non-navigational searches are
more likely to lead consumers to visit the trademark owner’s website. This is particularly
the case for the less pervasive trademarks in our data. These findings indicate that search
engine users are using trademarks in more subtle and varied ways than is often assumed.
As a result, changes in trademark policy cannot be assumed to have a uniform effect. We
explore the implications these findings have, both for trademark law and for consumer re-
search. In particular, we argue that the keyword advertising debate should not only focus
on consumer confusion, but also take the tradeoffs resulting from the ambiguous effects of
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keyword advertising into account. We also propose a novel way to empirically analyze the
effect of different allocations of property rights in intellectual property law.
The article proceeds as follows. Section II provides some background on U.S. and Eu-
ropean trademark law with regard to keyword advertising, and describes the policy change
Google implemented in Europe in September 2010. Section III describes the click-stream
data which we are using for our study. Section IV presents our empirical results. Section V
points to implications and limitations of our study and concludes.
II Legal Background
II.A Development of the Case Law
Like other intellectual property rights, the scope of trademark protection has expanded con-
siderably over time. Traditionally, the function of trademark law was to convey the origin
of a product or service. By overcoming information asymmetries between producers and
consumers, trademark law was perceived as a regulatory tool to eliminate inefficiencies re-
sulting from unraveling of markets due to asymmetric information (Akerlof 1970; Landes and
Posner 1987; Economides 1988). Generally speaking, current trademark discourse grapples
with the question of whether and to what extent trademark protection should be conceptu-
alized as a property right that reaches beyond clear cases of information asymmetries. In our
context, the question is whether or not trademark protection should interfere with keyword
advertising.
On the one hand, trademark owners deem it unfair that other firms can benefit from the
goodwill attaching to their marks by choosing the marks for keyword registration without
proper authorization, and that consumers may get confused by such ads. They also criticize
that search engine providers may benefit, at least indirectly, from such behavior. On the
other hand, trademark law does not protect trademark owners against each and every use of
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their registered marks by others. In addition, third-party use of trademarked keywords may
increase transparency and competition, thereby providing substantial benefits to consumers
and to society at large.
Where the Google AdWords system lies along this continuum is an open question and
differs across jurisdictions.5 In the United States, answering this question depends on (a)
whether Google’s use of trademarks as keywords to trigger ads is a ‘use in commerce’ under
§45 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1127), and (b) whether consumers are likely to be
confused by such use under §32 of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §1114). Since the Courts of
Appeals for the Second and the Ninth Circuit have both held that the use of a trademark
as a keyword to trigger ads is a ‘use in commerce,’6 the current discussion focuses on the
likelihood of consumer confusion. The relevant case law is fact-dependent and still in flux.
In 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded a summary
dismissal in a trademark infringement suit against Google, holding that there was a triable
issue of fact on direct and contributory trademark infringement and dilution. The court
also pointed to evidence of actual consumer confusion as presented by the plaintiff and to
related in-house studies by Google.7 In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
rejected a trademark infringement claim in a keyword advertising case, finding that there
was no likelihood of confusion of a sufficiently large number of consumers.8
In the European Union, numerous national courts had to decide (a) whether an adver-
5While this article focuses on the U.S. and Europe, keyword advertising is heavily debated in other
jurisdictions as well. In February 2013, the High Court of Australia held that Google is not liable under
Australian consumer protection laws for misleading keyword ads as Google does not create the ads “in any
authorial sense,” but merely operates a search engine as a means of communication between the advertisers
and consumers; see Google, Inc. v. Australian Competition and Consumer Comm’n, [2013] HCA 1, para.
68, 69 (Austl.). While the case did not focus on trademark-related issues, it prompted Google to revise its
keyword advertising policy for Australia and various other countries in April 2013. This policy change is not
the focus of this article.
6Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2009); Network Automation, Inc. v.
Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1144-1145 (9th Cir. 2011).
7Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012). In October 2012, the parties settled
the lawsuit.
81-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inv., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013).
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tiser can be held liable for trademark infringement if he uses a trademarked keyword, and
(b) whether search engine operators can be held liable as well, either through primary or
secondary liability doctrines. Different courts had reached wildly different conclusions on
both issues. Courts in France and Belgium, and some courts in Germany, had ruled that the
AdWords system violates trademark law or unfair competition law, on the grounds that the
advertisers and/or Google are using trademarks to confuse consumers, and are free-riding
on the goodwill of trademark owners. Courts in the U.K. and other courts in Germany had
ruled the opposite, while decisions in Austria and the Netherlands had come out somewhere
between these opposing viewpoints (Bednarz 2011; Laan 2014).
As these issues depend on the interpretation of various European Union rules – in par-
ticular the Trademark Directive 2008, the Community Trademark Regulation 2009, and the
E-Commerce Directive 2000 – it was not surprising that the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union had to provide guidance to national courts on several occasions. The first
dispute which reached the Court originated in France. In February 2005, a Paris regional
court found Google’s AdWords system guilty of infringing Louis Vuitton’s trademark. After
an appeals court in Paris had upheld this decision, Google appealed to the French Cour de
Cassation, which referred the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In March
2010, the Court decided the French Louis Vuitton case.9
The Court held that a producer of fake Louis Vuitton products may violate trademark law
if his keyword-backed ad creates the impression that his products are actually produced, or at
least authorized, by Louis Vuitton. Concerning Google’s liability, the court held that Google
was not using the Louis Vuitton trademark in its AdWords system in a manner covered
by European trademark law. Google was merely operating a service that might enable
advertisers to engage in trademark violations. Turning to secondary trademark infringement,
9Court of Justice of the EU, Google France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, Mar. 23, 2010, Joint Cases
C-236/08 to C-238/08, ECR 2010, I-02417.
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the Court noted that Google could be shielded from liability by provisions of the E-Commerce
Directive 2000. This depends on whether the Google AdWords system is a merely automatic
and passive system, or whether Google plays an active role in selecting and ordering ads.
The court refrained from providing a definite answer to this question, and referred the case
back to the French courts. Later decisions by the Court provided more detailed guidance
on consumer confusion, various functions of trademark protection, the role of trademark
limitations, and the liability of advertisers as opposed to search engines.10
Although the Louis Vuitton decision left various legal questions unresolved (Bechtold
2011), it was heralded as a victory for Google. Google had allowed third parties to register
trademarked keywords in the U.S. and Canada since 2004, in the U.K. and Ireland since
2008,11 and in various non-European countries since 2009, but it did not allow such third-
party registrations in most continental European countries. Following the Louis Vuitton
decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Google decided to change its policy
in continental Europe.
II.B Policy Change
Before the policy change, trademark owners could notify Google of their trademarks. Google
then blocked these trademarks from being purchased by third-party advertisers as a key-
word.12 On September 14, 2010, Google relaxed its policy on who was allowed to purchase
a trademarked keyword to trigger ads across all continental European countries. The policy
10Court of Justice of the EU, Eis.de GmbH v. BBY Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-91/09, Mar. 26,
2010, ECR 2010, I-43; BergSpechte Outdoor Reisen v. Gu¨nter Guni, Case C-278/08, Mar. 25, 2010, ECR
2010, I-2517; Portakabin Ltd v. Primakabin BV, Case C-558/08, Jul 8. 2010, ECR 2010, I-6963; Interflora
Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc., Case C-323/09, Sep. 22, 2011, ECR 2011, I-8625. For later decisions by
national courts, see Bednarz 2011; Laan 2014; High Court of Justice, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer
plc., [2013] EWHC 1291 (Ch.) (Eng.); Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice], 116 Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2014, 182 – Fleurop (Germany).
11High Court of Justice, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc., [2013] EWHC 1291, para. 100-104 (Ch.)
(Eng.).
12See High Court of Justice, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc., [2013] EWHC 1291, para. 100 (Ch.)
(Eng.).
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change was announced as follows on August 4, 2010:
We defended our position in a series of court cases that eventually made their
way up to the European Court of Justice, which earlier this year largely upheld
our position. The ECJ ruled that Google has not infringed trade mark law by
allowing advertisers to bid for keywords corresponding to third party trade marks.
Additionally, the court ruled that advertisers can legitimately use a third party
trademark as a keyword to trigger their ads.
Today, we are announcing an important change to our advertising trademark
policy. A company advertising on Google in Europe will now be able to select
trademarked terms as keywords. If, for example, a user types in a trademark of a
television manufacturer, he could now find relevant and helpful ads from resellers,
review sites and second hand dealers as well as ads from other manufacturers.
This new policy goes into effect on September 14. It brings our policy in Europe
into line with our policies in most countries across the world. [...]
After the policy change, Google still offered a procedure for trademark owners to complain
about the use of their trademark by third parties. However, under the new policy, the chances
of such complaints being upheld are more limited. In general, Google liberalized the keyword
registration system and allows limited complaints by trademark owners only in cases where
the core function of trademark law – to prevent consumer confusion – is affected.13 The
attractiveness of examining this policy change is that it was triggered by the timing of
a court decision, rather than endogenous changes in consumer behavior or search engine
strategy, making it a natural experiment.
II.C Consumer Behavior beyond Confusion
In both the United States and Europe, the legal assessment of keyword advertising has
traditionally focused on consumer confusion. As pointed out in Section II.A, in the United
States, a search engine’s trademark liability for third-party keyword registrations depends
on (a) whether the search engine’s use of trademarks as keywords to trigger ads is a ‘use
13The detailed rules are printed in Appendix A. As Google does not release data on the complaint
procedure, we are unable to empirically explore the extent to which this procedure has been used before and
after the policy change.
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in commerce,’ and (b) whether consumers are likely to be confused by such use. Courts
use variations of a multi-pronged test to determine likelihood of confusion (Beebe 2006).
Relevant factors include the similarity between both trademarks and goods, the strength
of the senior mark, evidence of actual confusion, the marketing channels used, product
quality, defendant’s intent, as well as consumer sophistication and similar characteristics
(McCarthy 2014, §§23:1, 24:29–24:43). In European keyword advertising cases, consumer
confusion plays an important role as well. An advertiser who uses a trademarked keyword
without authorization may be violating European trademark law if his keyword or product
are identical or similar to the right owner’s mark or product (Art. 5(1)(a), (b) Trademark
Directive 2008).
Consumer confusion about source, sponsorship or affiliation is a very important aspect
of keyword advertising case law in both the United States and Europe. Although vigor-
ously debated among trademark theorists (Beebe 2004, 623; Lemley 1999, 1967; Lemley
and McKenna 2010; Fhima 2011), trademark doctrine does not always require consumer
confusion for establishing trademark liability.14
We show that an exclusive focus on issues of consumer confusion captures neither how
consumers are using trademarks in their Internet search process nor what the effects of
consumer behavior on trademark owners, advertisers and, potentially, general welfare are.
Consumers are using trademarks in subtle and multi-faceted ways in their Internet searches.
They do not only enter trademarks into search engines in order to identify the trademark
14Examples of trademark liability without consumer confusion include anti-dilution doctrines (15 U.S.C.
§1125(c) and Art. 5(2) Trademark Directive 2008). For applications of such doctrines to keyword advertising,
see Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 167–173 (4th. Cir. 2012); Court of Justice of the
EU, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc., Case C-323/09, Sep. 22, 2011, ECR 2011, I-8625, §§77–78,
85–90. Concerning the “investment function” and the “advertisement function” of European trademark law
as applied to keyword advertising, see Court of Justice of the EU, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer
plc., Case C-323/09, Sep. 22, 2011, ECR 2011, I-8625, §§54–59, 60; Google France v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier, Mar. 23, 2010, Joint Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, ECR 2010, I-02417, §§92, 98; BergSpechte
Outdoor Reisen v. Gu¨nter Guni, Case C-278/08, Mar. 25, 2010, ECR 2010, I-2517, §34; Eis.de GmbH v.
BBY Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-91/09, Mar. 26, 2010, ECR 2010, I-43, §22; Portakabin Ltd. v.
Primakabin BV, Case C-558/08, Jul 8. 2010, ECR 2010, I-6963, §33.
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owner’s website where they can buy products or services. Rather, they may use a trade-
mark in their search term if they are looking for general information about the product;
for competitors or compatible components; for alternative distribution channels or third-
party after-sale services; for ways to finance the purchase of the product; they may use the
trademark as a generic shorthand for certain kinds of products; or they may not be fully
certain whether and what kind of product to buy (Goldman 2005; Dogan and Lemley 2007;
Franklyn and Hyman 2013; Blake et al. 2014; Gilson et al. 2014, §7A.09[2]; McCarthy 2014,
§25:70.25).
Finally, many consumers use search engines repeatedly in their decision-making process.
Empirical research shows that Internet searches often begin with very general ideas of what
product they are looking for (Lambrecht and Tucker 2013). As the multi-stage search process
continues, the search queries become increasingly specific and detailed. In the various stages
of the ‘buying funnel,’ which ranges from attracting awareness of the consumer through
her research and decision-making up to her actual product purchase, a consumer may use
trademarks in Internet searches in very different ways (Rutz and Bucklin 2011). In early
stages, an Internet search for a particular brand does not necessarily mean that the consumer
is only or even at all interested in products sold under this brand (Goldman 2005).15
The great variety with which consumers are using trademarks in their search behavior
indicates that a legal analysis which focuses on consumer confusion may not capture all
dimensions of trademark use in search engines (Goldman 2005). This has led the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to note that keyword advertising involves many trademark
uses that are “referential or nominative in nature” and that a “robotic application” of tra-
ditional likelihood-of-confusion tests is ill-suited to capture the real meaning of consumer
behavior in Internet search.16
15Appendix C shows examples from our data to demonstrate how search strategies evolve during a browsing
session.
16Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 154–155 (4th Cir. 2012).
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Given the multi-faceted use of trademarks in Internet search, we are interested in ob-
serving actual consumer behavior in keyword advertising systems and in distilling different
kinds of trademark uses from the data. We thereby hope to provide empirical evidence on
dimensions of trademark use that have not been discussed in the keyword advertising debate,
and to demonstrate how the effect of different allocations of intellectual property rights can
be analyzed empirically.
III Data
We are interested in whether the Google AdWords policy change had any visible effect on
consumer behavior. In order to address this question, we use click-stream data on Internet
user browsing behavior provided to us by Nielsen Europe. Nielsen Europe tracks the online
activity of a cross-European panel of a large number of users in order to provide commercial
data products. Our click-stream data represents the anonymized browsing behavior of 20,149
Internet users from France and Germany who have agreed to install a data collection plug-in
on their computers. This plug-in records the URL of each web page visited, together with a
time stamp.17 This data allows us to follow the exact sequence of web page visits and the
amount of time spent on each page.
Our data is grouped in browsing sessions and contains searches that occurred in the
months July to August 2010 and August 2011 to January 2012. We have 5,380,798 observa-
tions of browsing activity. The disconnected timespan reflects a script error that occurred
with data storage and parsing at Nielsen which limited the availability of data they were
able to share. Since the script error only affected the Bing searches which form the majority
of our control group, we have additional data on Google searches for September 2010 which
17For privacy purposes, the data delivered to us included the domain name and, sometimes, an anonymized
part of the URL, but not the full URL of each web page visited. This does not limit our ability to conduct the
study. Also in order to protect user privacy, we do not have demographic information about the anonymous
individual searchers.
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we use in a supplementary robustness check that we report in Appendix D.
Each browsing session starts with a search on either Google or another search engine and
follows the browsing behavior for the next live session of web browsing. Our click-stream
data encompasses browsing sessions that sometimes last for several hours. For our analysis,
we discard any observations of behavior which occur ten minutes after the search session
was initiated. Each search session starts with a search term that includes one of the brands
we identified as top brands in eight categories: automobile, airline, electronics, cell phone,
fashion, hotel, online services, as well as toys and gifts. We selected the top brands according
to industry-specific brand rankings (see, e.g., WPP 2011). Tables A-6 to A-12 in Appendix
E show the brands we use in each category and the number of search sessions for both
countries. While it would also be interesting to analyze less important brands, our focus on
top brands ensures that we have a sufficient number of observations in our dataset.
Table 1 provides summary statistics at the search-session level.18 Nearly half of all
searches led the searcher to visit the trademark owner’s website at some point. There are
several notable imbalances. First, more of the searches in our data originate from France
than from Germany. Unsurprisingly, there are also far more searches that originate from
Google than from other search engines. The majority of other searches that we observe were
performed on Bing (88.6%). The remaining searches originated from Yahoo! and MSN.
One crucial question is the extent to which policies on these other search engines remained
static. A challenge for researchers is that because these alternative search engines are less
used than Google, there is less data to use to establish the baseline. Another less obvious
problem is that there is less reporting surrounding non-Google search engine policy changes.
Another complication is that, although we study changes in the Google policy that applied
identically to France and Germany, Bing actually pursued two separate policies in these
18For the last three variables reported in Table 1, we have a lower number of observations than for the
other variables. They are contingent on consumers visiting the trademark owner’s website, which 42 percent
of all consumers in our data do within the 10-minutes time window analyzed by us.
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Table 1: Browsing Session Level Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min Max Observations
Decision time post-search 7.09 3.21 0 10 73376
Google 0.97 0.18 0 1 73376
Visit TM site 0.42 0.49 0 1 73376
# Visits TM site 2.74 5.27 0 76 73376
# Searches 1.93 1.60 1 22 73376
Germany 0.44 0.50 0 1 73376
France 0.56 0.50 0 1 73376
Search not exact match to trademark 0.80 0.40 0 1 73376
# Words in search 3.30 2.08 1 47 73376
Levenshtein distance 14.2 13.1 0 242 73376
Searched after TM site 0.0093 0.096 0 1 30807
# Sites before TM site 11.0 25.3 1 514 30807
# Searches before TM site 1.30 0.85 1 16 30807
countries reflecting different partnerships. At that time, Bing sold paid search ads via the
Yahoo! network in Germany. As a consequence, it did not investigate complaints about the
use of trademarks as keywords during the period we study. In France, Bing sold its paid
search ads directly. As of January 2013, its Intellectual Property Guidelines reported:
[...] for France, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Singapore, and the United Kingdom
only, Microsoft will also investigate a complaint about trademark infringement in
keyword use after it receives all required information via the Intellectual Property
Complaint Form. Advertisers may not bid on keywords, or use in the content
of ads, any term whose use would infringe the trademark of any third party or
otherwise be unlawful or in violation of the rights of any third party.19
This means that our control group has a divided set of trademark policies. Theoretically,
this should not matter if we think of the control as simply capturing basic changes that
occurred over time in how consumers searched. However, since this does restrict clean
interpretation of the coefficients, we also re-estimate our model for each set of countries with
the different baseline trademark policies as a control in a robustness check.
A related concern is that Bing changed its policies at the same time, perhaps in response
19Today’s Intellectual Property Guidelines of Bing differ slightly. They are available at http://
advertise.bingads.microsoft.com/en-us/editorial-intellectual-property-guidelines.
16
to the Google change in policy. To investigate this we examined whether the number of
searches on Bing that ended in the user clicking on a paid search changed over the period.
We found no statistically significant difference (t=0.45, p=0.65).20 We also saw no change
in the amount of time users took to make a decision (t=1.32, p=0.1838) after searching
suggesting that there were no large changes in the navigability of the Bing search engine
in this period. We also checked that in the period we studied, there was no change in the
nature of searches across the population which could provide alternative explanations of our
results, for example because of an evolving autocorrect feature. We saw no change in the
amount of words that consumers were using for their searches (t=0.82, p=0.41).
In general, the session data reveals the complexity of many searches. They often involve
numerous trademark terms, can last many hours21 and potentially cover hundreds of websites.
This is exemplified by Table A-1 in Appendix B, which provides a snapshot of the start of
a typical search session.
IV Empirical Analysis
IV.A Aggregate Analysis
We are interested in whether we can distill from our data any signs that consumer behav-
ior has been affected by the policy change in the Google AdWords system. Our analysis
compares the changes in browsing behavior on Google, where the policy change occurred in
September 2010, to that on other search engines, where no such change occurred at that
time.
Given the novelty of our data, the key challenge is to define dependent variables which
20We also checked with sources at Microsoft, and there was no change in advertising policies in Germany
in the period we study, except for those pertaining to online gambling. See also the discussion in High Court
of Justice, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer plc., [2013] EWHC 1291, para. 112 (Ch.) (Eng.), with regard
to Bing’s keyword advertising policy in the United Kingdom.
21As mentioned above, we only look at the first ten minutes of a search session in our data analysis.
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adequately capture important dimensions of consumer behavior. Our major focus in our
empirical analysis is a dependent variable which captures whether a consumer, after having
entered her search request to the search engine, ever visits the trademark owner’s website.
This is recorded by an indicator variable equal to one if the searcher ever at some point visits
the trademark owner’s website within the 10-minute time frame of our analysis. The idea
is that a searcher who is looking for a particular trademark may find it easier or harder or
more desirable or less desirable, depending on the design of the search engine’s advertising
system, to identify and proceed to the website of the trademark owner.
While this dependent variable may not be perfect, it seems a first-order measure of
trademark owners’ concerns and of whether consumer behavior changed after Google’s policy
change in September 2010. After all, the majority of concerns expressed by trademark owners
is that they will lose traffic from consumers, if consumers are redirected to other websites due
to extended keyword advertising by third parties. Such concerns may be less severe given
that a trademark owner may also benefit indirectly from consumers visiting a third-party
website, if the consumer then buys the trademark owner’s product from the third-party
website. While our dependent variable does not allow us to explore such effects in detail, we
are able to provide a rough quantification of the concerns expressed by trademark owners.
We do not claim to be presenting a method which fully captures whether consumers
are more or less confused about the origin of an Internet ad. A full legal assessment of
consumer confusion would involve an analysis of the text of the ad, the similarity between
the products or services in question, and many other factors. Rather, we are presenting a
method for distilling various aspects of consumer behavior from a novel fine-grained dataset
which may illuminate aspects of trademarks discourse not focused on before.
We use a straightforward difference-in-difference specification. For person i using search
engine k who searches for trademark j in country c at time t:
V isitTMSiteijkct = β1TriggersAllowedt ×Googlek + β2TriggersAllowedt + β3Googlek +montht + γc + αj + ijk
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Our key variable of interest is TriggersAllowed × Google which captures the effect of
the policy change on Google. Google captures the baseline difference in search behavior
between Google and other search engines. TriggersAllowed captures whether the search
took place after the change of the Google keyword advertising policy. We also include an
extensive series of vectors of controls, including binary indicators for each of the trademarks,
countries, and months in our data. The inclusion of month-fixed effects means that our
controls are collinear with the main effect of TriggersAllowed. Hence, we do not report the
coefficient for this variable.
We estimate this specification using Ordinary Least Squares in order to facilitate inter-
pretation of the interaction term (Ai and Norton 2003), but also later show robustness to
functional form specification that takes account of the fact that this is a discrete choice.
Table 2 reports our initial results in Column (1). The key variable TriggersAllowed ×
Google is not precisely estimated. This suggests that, on average, the policy did not have
a precisely measurable effect. The estimated coefficients for Google suggest that, relative
to the control group of searches on other search engines, searches on Google appear to be
consistently associated with fewer visits to the trademark owner’s site and more searches
and activity before a visit to the trademark owner’s site even before the policy change. The
estimated coefficient for Germany suggests that, relative to France, searches originating in
Germany are less likely to lead to a trademark owner’s site and also more likely to engage
in multiple searches prior to a visit to a trademark owner’s site. This may reflect differences
with regard to national characteristics relating to the search for products.
IV.B Distinguishing Between Navigational and Non-Navigational Search
Column (1) of Table 2 suggests that there was no large measurable average effect that can
be traced in our data to the change in Google’s policy. One possible interpretation is that
the change in policy did not affect consumer behavior. The other interpretation is that the
19
Table 2: Year vs. Year Comparison
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Triggers allowed × Google 0.031 -0.092∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.071∗∗ -0.024
(0.031) (0.018) (0.031) (0.031) (0.025)
Triggers allowed × Google × not exact match 0.147∗∗∗
(0.034)
Triggers allowed × Google × number words 0.028∗∗∗
(0.009)
Triggers allowed × Google × change words 0.028∗∗∗
(0.009)
Triggers allowed × Google × Levenshtein 0.003∗∗
(0.001)
Google -0.094∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ -0.023 -0.023 -0.057∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.021)
Germany -0.107∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Not exact match -0.267∗∗∗
(0.030)
Triggers allowed × not exact match -0.127∗∗∗
(0.034)
Google × not exact match -0.170∗∗∗
(0.030)
Number words -0.033∗∗∗
(0.007)
Triggers allowed × number words -0.016∗
(0.009)
Google × number words -0.020∗∗∗
(0.007)
Change words -0.032∗∗∗
(0.007)
Triggers allowed × change words -0.016∗
(0.009)
Google × change words -0.020∗∗∗
(0.007)
Levenshtein -0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)
Triggers allowed × Levenshtein -0.002
(0.001)
Google × Levenshtein -0.002
(0.001)
Trademark controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 73376 73376 73376 73376 73376
R2 0.233 0.317 0.263 0.263 0.256
NOTE: Dependent variable is whether or not the user ultimately visited the trademark owner’s
website. Ordinary least squares. Standard errors clustered at the trademark level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
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policy had a mixture of effects on different types, which balanced each other out.
Imagine a consumer who wants to visit a trademark owner’s website and simply is using
the search engine to find out the correct URL. When such a consumer enters the trademarked
product name into the search engine, she is looking for a website maintained or authorized
by the trademark owner. For such a consumer engaging in a navigational search, allowing
third-party use of trademarked keywords may make her search harder, as her attention is
potentially drawn to many websites which are not maintained or authorized by the trademark
owner. As a result, a keyword policy which allows third-party registrations of trademarked
keywords may impede navigational search. This is the potential negative effect trademark
owners are worried about.
On the other hand, imagine a consumer who is not necessarily looking to navigate to
the trademark owner’s website because she is perhaps at an earlier stage in her purchase
decision process or who has already bought the product. At this different cognitive stage
of ad processing (Barry and Howard 1990), she may react differently to a consumer just
doing a navigational search. Such a non-navigational consumer may be looking for more
information about product features and compatibilities; she may be looking for alternative
distribution channels or post-sale independent repair and spare part services; she may be
looking for competing products or for ways to finance the purchase of the product; she may
use the trademark in her search request as a substitute for a generic product description;
or she may not be fully certain what kind of product she eventually wants to buy. For
such a consumer engaging in a non-navigational search, third-party advertising may provide
additional helpful information. The sponsored link auction operated by the search engine
may provide the consumer with information about the relative quality of ads sponsored
by a trademark owner and his competitors (Athey and Ellison 2011).22 By updating the
22Furthermore, consumers engaging in non-navigational searches may create positive externalities: Their
search for competing products or related services can contribute to an increase in price competition. This
may, indirectly, also benefit trademark owners.
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consumer’s information set, third-party ads may affect her decision about which website to
visit. As a result, a consumer engaging in a non-navigational search may actually benefit
from the more diverse information being presented to her if third-party use of trademarked
keywords is allowed, because she may be able to find competing products or services more
easily, or because it may assist her in identifying the trademark owner’s product or service
as her own favorite.
The effect of keyword advertising policy changes on trademark owners may therefore
vary alongside these different consumer behaviors. On the one hand, trademark owners may
benefit from easier navigational searches under a strict keyword policy which does not allow
third-party use of trademarked keywords. On the other hand, trademark owners may lose
visits from non-navigational searchers under such policy, who otherwise could be prompted to
visit the trademark owner’s website because of the additional informative advertising about
the various external sites that offer associated products. As a result of these counteracting
effects, the overall effect of a keyword advertising policy change is ambiguous.
We use various ways to distinguish between navigational and non-navigational searches
in our data, in order to measure the potentially heterogeneous effect of a policy change on
both kinds of searches. Given that we have to categorize 93,878 search terms in our data,
we are taking advantage of various automated ways to distinguish navigational and non-
navigational searches. Table 3 provides an overview of the various approaches we use in the
subsequent columns of Table 2.
Table 3: Approaches to Distinguish Navigational from Non-Navigational Searches
Distinction Navigational Non-navigational
Exact match iPhone iPhone battery repair Paris
Number of words Ibis hotel Traveler reviews for Ibis hotel in Amsterdam
Change in number of
words
Barbie→ Barbie doll Barbie → Barbie working conditions workers
China
Levenshtein distance
Blackberry →
Blackberry phone
Blackberry→ Blackberry curve 8520 is unable
to connect to internet due to wi fi
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One way to distinguish navigational from non-navigational searches is to divide searches
explicitly according to whether they used the trademark alone, or the trademark in conjunc-
tion with other words (Row 1 of Table 3). The idea is that this will allow identification of
a navigational versus non-navigational effect because consumers who are using the search
engine as a shortcut to reach a trademark owner’s website are more likely to just use the
trademark alone to navigate as a shortcut. Column (2) of Table 2 therefore expands our
analysis to stratify the results according to whether someone searched using the precise
trademark, or the trademark together with other words. The size of the effect suggests that
after the policy change, there was a 9.2 percent decrease in consumers visiting the trademark
owners’ websites who used a search phrase that exactly matched the trademark. However,
consumers who were searching using the trademark alongside other words were more likely
to reach the trademark owners’ websites in 14.7 percent of all browsing sessions. This is an
increase of 5.5 percent in comparison to navigational searches.23 For the entire time period
we observe, 87% of navigational searches reach the trademark owner’s website, while only
31% of non-navigational searches reach such website within the 10-minute time frame of our
analysis. Our interpretation of these results is that we observe heterogeneity in treatment
effects because the policy change had differential effects on searches that were navigational
and searches that were using the trademark in a non-navigational manner.
The second approach we took involves stratifying our data by the number of words used in
the keyword search. For example, ‘Ibis Hotel’ would qualify as two words, while a search for
‘Traveler reviews for Ibis Hotel in Amsterdam’ would count as seven words (Row 2 of Table
3). The basic idea underlying this stratification is that shorter searches containing fewer
words are more likely to represent attempts to navigate to the trademark owner’s website,
whereas searches with more words are more likely to use a search term in a non-navigational
23These numbers indicate relative changes, compared to the average number of consumers visiting the
trademark owners’ websites over our entire data period.
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manner.
Column (3) of Table 2 reports the results of this specification. The negative coefficient
on TriggersAllowed×Google suggests that a consumer using a trademark in her search is
less likely to visit the trademark owner’s website if she was searching on Google after the
change in Google’s policy. However, the positive coefficient on TriggersAllowed×Google×
NumberWords suggests that this is moderated by the length of the string of words that was
used for the search. Indeed, the relative magnitudes of the two point estimates suggest that
the negative effect of the policy change was reversed for instances where the searcher used
more than three words. Also of interest is the baseline negative effect of NumberWords.
This suggests that, in general, searches that contain fewer words are less likely to lead the
searcher to the trademark owner’s website.
We next attempt to identify non-navigational searches by looking at cases in which
searchers start their search session with a brief search, but add more contextual words to
their search over time. We measure this by looking at the change in the number of words
that a searcher uses during her search session. Row 3 of Table 3 provides an example. The
idea is that the more the search term changes during a search session, the less likely it is that
a searcher was simply using the search engine as a shortcut to reach a trademark owner’s
website. Instead it seems more likely she was trying to find out information which requires
increasing context. As shown in Table A-2 in Appendix C, searches can often evolve from an
initial use of a trademark as the user refines her search. Column (4) of Table 2 reports the
results. Similar to our other specifications using other proxies for non-navigational search,
the results suggest that the more a searcher changes her search term during a search session,
the more likely it is that she will visit the trademark owner’s website after the policy change
on Google.
Finally, a more technical way to capture this idea of evolving searches is to use the
Levenshtein distance to determine the distance between a searcher’s baseline search term
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and her other search terms in the search trail, conditional on the same trademark being
present in the search string. Levenshtein distance, or edit distance, is the smallest number
of edits required to make one string match a second string (Levenshtein 1966). The idea is
that the larger the distance between the baseline search and the follow-up refined searches
is, the more likely the searcher is engaged in a non-navigational search since she is less likely
to refine her search extensively if she only wants to use the search engine as a shortcut. Row
4 of Table 3 provides an example. Column (5) of Table 2 reports the results. They are less
precisely estimated, but their direction echoes our earlier findings.
Neither of the approaches to distinguish navigational from non-navigational searches
works perfectly. We cannot exclude, for example, that we treat some searches as navigational
although they are in fact non-navigational. An example would be a consumer who enters
“iphone” into a search engine, but uses the brand as a generic shortcut for smart phone.
Another example would be a search session which starts with a navigational intent, but
develops into a non-navigational search over time. We should emphasize that we take the
conceptual distinction between navigational and non-navigational users from the literature
rather than deriving it from our data. This reduces concerns that our results are somewhat
tautologous and an artefact of the interaction between the categorization and our data.
Taken together, our findings provide an informative picture indicating that a large number
of searches for trademarks are non-navigational, and that the effect of the policy change
depends on the kind of search performed.
IV.C Robustness Checks
We followed up this analysis with various robustness checks for our finding that the Google
policy change was associated with a shift in behavior towards the likelihood of visiting a
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trademark owner’s website. Table 4 reports the results.24 One concern is that our results are
affected by search engine switching and other selection problems. Therefore, we are interested
in whether the heterogeneous treatment effects can only be observed when looking at the
data in the aggregate or also when tracing individual users over time. Column (1) shows
that our main result (from Column (2) of Table 2) holds when introducing user-level fixed
effects which take advantage of the fact that some of the users in our data made multiple
searches using different trademark terms before and after the policy change.
Another concern is whether our results are being driven by a particular set of circum-
stances in either Germany or France. Or, alternatively, the fact that the baseline trademark
policies of Bing in each of these countries was different (see Section III), might affect or dis-
tort our results. Our analysis is reported separately for both of these countries in Columns
(2) and (3). The key interaction is in the same direction in both countries, though the
measured effect of the policy is higher in Germany which may reflect the different baseline
policies in these two countries. In Column (4), we report results that show estimates from
a logit model that reflects the binary nature of the dependent variable. Again, the results
are similar to before. They are also robust when we apply the Ai–Norton correction to this
logit estimate (Ai and Norton 2003).
We then turn to consider different timing assumptions in Table 5: Columns (1)-(3) of
Table 5 present results where we use a finer time window than ten minutes to see whether
a user reaches a trademark owner’s website. In each case, we explore whether the user
reaches the trademark owner’s website in increasingly broad time windows. The fact that
the coefficient on the main interaction effect is positive and significant when we look at just
a six-second time window suggests that the measured effect captures immediate navigation
to the trademark owner’s website. However, the increase in size and significance of the effect
24We also checked whether our findings are driven by some searchers who visited a lot of websites, as
indicated by the maximum values in Table 1. Our findings are robust to dropping extreme observations.
26
Table 4: Year vs. Year Comparison: Robustness Checks for Interactions
Fixed Effects Germany France Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Triggers allowed × Google -0.114∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -1.388∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.083) (0.021) (0.375)
Triggers allowed × Google × not exact match 0.259∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 1.659∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.100) (0.050) (0.422)
Not exact match -0.201∗∗∗ -0.214∗ -0.282∗∗∗ -2.022∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.121) (0.091) (0.430)
Triggers allowed × not exact match -0.227∗∗∗ -0.197∗ -0.117∗∗ -1.239∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.106) (0.050) (0.444)
Google 0.028 0.083 0.039∗ 0.168
(0.027) (0.062) (0.023) (0.288)
Google × not exact match -0.204∗∗∗ -0.179∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.816∗∗
(0.051) (0.099) (0.065) (0.336)
Trademark controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 46355 32251 41125 73272
R2 0.291 0.239 0.344
NOTE: Dependent variable is whether the searcher visits the trademark owner’s website. Ordinary least
squares except in Column (4) where logit results are presented. Standard errors clustered at the trademark
level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
when we move to a one minute window suggests that it also reflects cases where the consumer
hesitates in her search.
Another dimension of the timing question is what happens after a user has visited the
trademark owner’s website. Column (4) of Table 5 captures this dimension. We measure
whether a searcher has consulted a search engine after having visited the trademark owner’s
website, conditional on the trademark still being part of the search string. The idea is that
a searcher who has to consult a search engine several times after visiting the trademark
owner’s website is more likely to be a non-navigational than a navigational searcher.25
Column (4) indicates that, while the chances that a navigational searcher visits the
trademark owner’s website have decreased after the policy change, she is – compared to her
behavior before the policy change – also consulting search engines less often after having
visited the trademark owner’s website. One speculative interpretation of this finding would
25Table A-3 in Appendix C provides an example of a search session before and after visiting a trademark
owner’s website.
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be that the level of confidence navigational searchers have in visiting the trademark owner’s
website could have increased after the policy change. After the change, a navigational
searcher may be first distracted by more diverse information, including third-party keyword
ads. Once she has filtered this information, however, she may be more confident that the
trademark owner’s website is actually the website she has been looking for.
We also analyze the time searchers spend on the trademark owner’s website if they visit
the site. Column (5) of Table 5 shows that, after the policy change, navigational searchers
spend less time browsing on the trademark owner’s website. However, non-navigational
searchers, whose number is considerably large in our sample, spend more time on the trade-
mark owner’s website.
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Finally, we analyze whether our findings depend on the prevalence of the trademark. One
potential concern with our study is that we focus on top brands. While this ensures that we
have a sufficient number of observations for each trademark in our dataset, it impedes our
ability to generalize our findings to less popular trademarks. It could be, however, that the
display of third-party ads has a stronger effect on less popular brands, as consumers need
more information on these brands and the affiliated products. To address this concern, we
rank the trademarks analyzed according to how often users search for them in our dataset.
This enables us to test whether our heterogeneity finding varies with trademark popularity.
Table 6 reports the results. Columns (1) and (2) of the table shows that the positive effect
of non-navigational users on visits of the trademark owners’ website is inversely related to
the popularity of the trademark: The less popular a trademark becomes, the stronger the
effect is. This finding also relates to Blake et al. (2014) whose study suggests that keyword
advertising may be less effective for well-known brands. We also take advantage of the fact
that the popularity of brands may differ between Germany and France, and allow the brand
ranking measure to vary by country in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. The results confirm
the findings of Columns (1) and (2).
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V Conclusion
V.A Findings
Trademark law is rooted in the belief that the granting of property rights is necessary in
order to overcome information asymmetries and other market failures in consumer markets.
While trademark research has always been interested in consumers’ reactions to various
trademark regimes, the law usually had to resort to indirect measurements of consumer
behavior. With increasing digitization and the ever-growing population of consumers on the
Internet, the situation has changed significantly. Fine-grained data on consumer behavior
has become available, ready for data-mining and analysis by intellectual property as well as
law & economics researchers.
In the trademark context, keyword-based advertising systems are a useful application of
this kind of research, as click-stream data on Internet browsing provide large amounts of fine-
grained data that inform us about one of the most contentious debates in current trademark
jurisprudence. In this article, we explore a novel method to measure consumer behavior in
online search. We shed some light on the effect of a liberal trademark policy on browsing
behavior in keyword advertising systems. More generally, we demonstrate how click-stream
data can be used to empirically assess the effect of different allocations of property rights in
intellectual property law.
We present arguments why a change in keyword advertising policies may have different
effects on navigational versus non-navigational searches. Search engine users who search for
a trademark because they are directly interested in visiting the trademark owner’s website
may fare better under a strict keyword advertising policy which does not allow third-party
use of trademarked keywords. However, search engine users who are searching for trade-
marks in order to find out more about alternative distribution channels, independent repair
services or competing products, or who are at a very early stage of the preference formation
32
process, may fare better under a liberal keyword policy, as they benefit from an increase in
product information and price competition. Providing non-navigational searchers with more
information from various sources may facilitate their search for competing products; or it
may assist them to better focus their attention on the trademark owner’s website (see Chiou
and Tucker 2012). Trademark owners may benefit from easier navigational searches under a
strict keyword policy. However, they may receive fewer visits from non-navigational searchers
who may be more likely to seek out the trademark owner’s website if exposed initially to
informative advertising about the various external sites that offer associated products. As a
result, the overall effect of keyword advertising policies seems ambiguous.
Our data allows us to identify the heterogeneous effect the European Google AdWords
policy change in September 2010 had on browsing behavior. Our findings indicate that, while
navigational searches are less likely to lead to visits to the trademark owner’s website after
the policy change (decreasing by 9.2 percent), non-navigational searches are more likely to
lead the user to the trademark owner’s website in 14.7 percent of all browsing sessions. This
is an increase of 5.5 percent in comparison to navigational searches. This is particularly the
case for the less pervasive trademarks in our data.
V.B Implications
This enables us to reflect on the overall relationship between trademark protection and
keyword advertising. In a world in which control rights over keyword advertising are fully
allocated to trademark owners, navigational searches are more likely to lead to the trademark
owner’s website, compared to a world in which such control rights are allocated, at least in
part, to third parties. However, this increase in navigational search effectiveness is accom-
panied and, potentially, even counterweighted by a decrease in non-navigational searchers
reaching the trademark owner’s website. Also, search effectiveness may not be increased for
all navigational searchers under a strict keyword advertising policy.
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Consider the example where a consumer searches for “Samsung” because she wants to buy
a Samsung phone. If she is exposed to third-party ads from independent distributors, clicks
on one of these ads, compares the Samsung phone with competing offers and then buys the
Samsung phone from the independent distributor’s website, she sticks to her original plan to
buy a Samsung phone while never visiting the Samsung website. Although we observe in our
data that this consumer has never visited the trademark owner’s website, such observation is
not indicative of any confusion or diversion of attention. We find that, after the policy change,
it is harder for navigational searchers to reach the trademark owner’s website. The finding
must be interpreted with this example in mind. Not every visit which trademark owners
lose from navigational users after the policy change leads to lost profits or lost consumer
attention. While we are unable to provide any detailed quantification, our findings provide
an upper bound to potential negative effects of the policy change on trademark owners:
They only suffer from negative consequences caused by changing browsing behavior of a
sub-class of navigational users. In our data, only 20 percent of searches appear to be purely
navigational. Among those 20 percent, an unknown magnitude of searches does not have
negative effects on trademark owners.26
For trademark owners, this means that a keyword advertising policy which does not
allow third-party use of trademarked keyword is not necessarily better, as trademark owners
may lose traffic from non-navigational searchers and the negative effects they suffer from
navigational searchers may be limited. For search engine users, the effect of a strict keyword
advertising policy depends on whether the search is a navigational or non-navigational one.
While a strict keyword advertising policy provides some benefits to trademark owners and
some consumers, a liberal policy may benefit third party advertisers, some consumers, and,
26Our analysis is thereby in line with 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1244 (10th
Cir. 2013), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected an initial-interest confusion
claim by noting that the empirically observed click-through rate on Google ads puts an upper bound to how
often an initial-interest confusion potentially occurred.
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indirectly, some trademark owners.
Our article provides data to shed some light on a tradeoff that has been under-represented
in the current debate on keyword advertising. Our analysis indicates that, by focusing on
consumer confusion, the trademark discussion does not fully capture the multi-faceted ways
in which search engine users are using trademarks today. A close analysis of the tradeoffs re-
sulting from the counteracting effects seems warranted. This is not only of particular impor-
tance as questions of consumer confusion are likely to be less important for non-navigational
searchers, who represent a significant portion of consumers in our data. It is also timely
as trademark courts on both sides of the Atlantic are willing to refrain from a mechanical
application of likelihood-of-confusion tests27 and call for proof of changes in the economic
behavior of consumers.28 Our article presents an approach how such analysis can be per-
formed in trademark cases, thereby also extending the methodological toolbox available in
trademark litigation cases.29
V.C Limitations
Some limitations of our study should be mentioned. First, while our data allows us to
check whether a navigational searcher has found the trademark owner’s website, our inter-
pretation of non-navigational search behavior is more limited. We only identify whether a
non-navigational searcher reaches the trademark owner’s website or not within the 10-minute
time frame of our analysis. However, we do not measure whether such a searcher finds the
information she is actually looking for, since this would require stated intent data we do not
27Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 154–155 (4th Cir. 2012).
28Court of Justice of the EU, Intel Corp. v. CPM United Kingdom Ltd., Case C-252/07, Nov. 27, 2008,
ECR 2008, I-8823, §77; Environmental Manufacturing LLP v. OHIM, Case C-383/12 P, Nov. 14, 2013,
§§34–43.
29Compared to the ad impression, click-through, eye-tracking heat map and aggregate browsing data used
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the British High Court of Justice in 1-800 Contacts,
Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1244 (10th Cir. 2013), and [2013] EWHC 1291 (Ch.) (Eng.), our
data is richer in that it is real-world observational data on the individual user level which captures individual
browsing behavior over time.
35
have access to. We also cannot observe from the data to what extent trademark owners care
about visits from non-navigational searchers. This may depend on the type of product as
well as the structure of a trademark owner’s distribution channel and the market the trade-
mark owner is operating in. Second, while we can identify heterogeneous effects of the policy
change in our data, our ability to quantify these effects in an economic sense is more limited.
Third, we believe the distinction between navigational and non-navigational search adds an
important dimension to the policy debate on keyword advertising, but our article should
not be understood as an attempt to provide a definite answer to the question of whether
or not keyword advertising is a violation of U.S. or European trademark law. In particular,
we cannot test whether consumers are confused by third-party keyword advertising. Deter-
mining likelihood of confusion is “an inherently factual issue that depends on the facts and
circumstances in each case.”30 It requires an analysis of the actual ad text,31 which we do
not observe in our data. Fourth, our analysis does not differentiate between various types
of trademarks or industries, to ensure that we have a sufficient number of observations in
our dataset. Fifth, while we have information on the official Google AdWords policy, we do
not observe to what extent trademark owners have opposed to their trademarks being used
as keywords by third parties and filed complaints either before or after the policy change.
Finally, we do neither observe potential licensing deals between trademark owners and third
parties nor have information on how bidding behavior by advertisers evolved over time.
Nevertheless, the article presents a novel approach to empirically assess the effect of dif-
ferent allocations of property rights in intellectual property law. It points to a heterogeneity
in the effect of the Google AdWords policy change on consumer behavior that has not yet
30Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 153 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Court of Justice of the
EU, Sabe`l BV v. Puma AG, Case C-251/95, Nov. 11, 1997, ECR 1997, I-6191, §22.
31Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1154 (9th Cir. 2011); 1-800
Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.34d 1229, 1245 (10th Cir. 2013); Court of Justice of the EU, Google
France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, Mar. 23, 2010, Joint Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, ECR 2010, I-02417,
§§83–84; BergSpechte Outdoor Reisen v. Gu¨nter Guni, Case C-278/08, Mar. 25, 2010, ECR 2010, I-2517,
§39; Eis.de GmbH v. BBY Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-91/09, Mar. 26, 2010, ECR 2010, I-43, §24.
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received proper attention in trademark discourse. It is this heterogeneity, the resulting trade-
offs and the underlying allocation of property rights on which the keyword advertising debate
should focus.
37
References
Aguiar, L. and B. Martens (2013). Digital Music Consumption on the Internet: Evidence
from Clickstream Data. http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRS79605.pdf. JRC Technical Re-
port 2013/04.
Ai, C. and E. C. Norton (2003). Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models. Economics
Letters 80, 123–129.
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The Market for ”Lemons:” Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488–500.
Athey, S. and G. Ellison (2011). Position Auctions with Consumer Search. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 126, 1213–1270.
Bakos, Y., F. Marotta-Wurgler, and D. R. Trossen (2014). Does Anyone Read the Fine
Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts. Journal of Legal Studies 43,
1–35.
Barry, T. E. and D. J. Howard (1990). A Review and Critique of the Hierarchy of Effects in
Advertising. International Journal of Advertising 9, 121–135.
Bechtold, S. (2011). Google AdWords and European Trademark Law. Communications of
the ACM 54, 30–32.
Bednarz, T. (2011). Keyword Advertising before the French Supreme Court and Beyond:
Calm at Last after Turbulent Times for Google and its Advertising Clients? International
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 42, 641–672.
Beebe, B. (2004). The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law. UCLA Law Review 51, 621–704.
Beebe, B. (2006). An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement.
California Law Review 94, 1581–1654.
Bird, R. C. and J. H. Steckel (2012). The Role of Consumer Surveys in Trademark Infringe-
ment: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts. University of Pennsylvania Journal
of Business Law 14, 1013–1053.
Blake, T., C. Nosko, and S. Tadelis (2014). Consumer Heterogeneity and Paid Search Effec-
tiveness: A Large Scale Field Experiment. NBER Working Paper 20171.
Busse, M., J. Silva-Risso, and F. Zettelmeyer (2006). $1,000 Cash Back: The Pass-Through
of Auto Manufacturer Promotions. American Economic Review 96, 1253–1270.
Chiou, L. and C. Tucker (2012). How Does the Use of Trademarks by Third-Party Sellers
Affect Online Search? Marketing Science 31, 819–837.
38
Community Trademark Regulation (2009). Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26
February 2009 on the Community Trade Mark. Official Journal, Mar. 24, 2009, L 78,
1–42.
Dogan, S. L. and M. A. Lemley (2007). Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark
Use. Iowa Law Review 92, 1669–1701.
E-Commerce Directive (2000). Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in partic-
ular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (”Directive on Electronic Commerce”).
Official Journal, July 17, 2000, L 178, 1–16.
Economides, N. S. (1988). The Economics of Trademarks. Trademark Reporter 78, 523–539.
Edelman, B., M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz (2007). Internet Advertising and the Gener-
alized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords. American
Economic Review 97, 242–259.
Fhima, I. S. (2011). Trade Mark Dilution in Europe and the United States. Oxford University
Press.
Franklyn, D. and D. A. Hyman (2013). Trademarks as Keywords: Much Ado About Some-
thing? Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 26, 481–543.
Gilson, A., K. Green, and J. Gilson (2014). Gilson on Trademarks. LexisNexis.
Goldfarb, A. (2014). What is Different about Online Advertising? Review of Industrial
Organization, 115–129.
Goldman, E. (2005). Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law. Emory Law
Journal 54, 507–596.
Goldman, E. (2009). Brand Spillovers. Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 22, 381–420.
Google (2014). 2014 Financial Tables. http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.
html.
Ho, D. E. and D. B. Rubin (2011). Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal Studies.
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 7, 17–40.
Jansen, B. J., D. L. Booth, and A. Spink (2008). Determining the Informational, Naviga-
tional, and Transactional Intent of Web Queries. Information Processing and Manage-
ment 44, 1251–1266.
Laan, N. v. d. (2014). The Use of Trade Marks in Keyword Advertising: Developments in
ECJ and National Jurisprudence. In N. Lee, G. Westkamp, A. Kur, and A. Ohly (Eds.),
Intellectual Property, Unfair Competition and Publicity, pp. 231–286. Edward Elgar.
39
Lambrecht, A. and C. Tucker (2013). When Does Retargeting Work? Information Specificity
in Online Advertising. Journal of Marketing Research 50, 561–576.
Landes, W. M. and R. A. Posner (1987). Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective. Journal
of Law and Economics 30, 265–309.
Lemley, M. A. (1999). The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense. Yale
Law Journal 108, 1687–1715.
Lemley, M. A. and M. P. McKenna (2010). Owning Mark(et)s. Michigan Law Review 109,
137–189.
Levenshtein, V. I. (1966). Binary Codes Capable of Correcting Deletions, Insertions and
Reversals. Soviet Physics Doklady 10, 707–710.
McCarthy, J. T. (2014). McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition. Clard Boardman
Callaghan.
Rosso, M. A. and B. J. Jansen (2010). Brand Names as Keywords in Sponsored Search
Advertising. Communications of the Association for Information Systems 27, 81–98.
Rutz, O. J. and R. E. Bucklin (2011). From Generic to Branded: A Model of Spillover in
Paid Search Advertising. Journal of Marketing Research 48, 87–102.
Sarel, D. and H. Marmorstein (2009). The Effect of Consumer Surveys and Actual Confusion
Evidence in Trademark Litigation: An Empirical Assessment. Trademark Reporter 99,
1416–1436.
Trademark Directive (2008). Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 October 2008 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to
Trade Marks. Official Journal, Nov. 8, 2008, L 299, 25–33.
Varian, H. R. (2007). Position Auctions. Industrial Journal of International Organization 25,
1163–1178.
WPP (2011). 2011 BrandZ Top 100: Most Valuable Global Brands. http://www.wpp.com/
wpp/marketing/brandz/brandz-2011/.
40
Appendix
A Complaints Procedure
After Google changed its European keyword advertising policy in September 2010, it still
offers a procedure for trademark owners to complain about the use of their trademark by
third parties. The requirements for such complaints were explained by Google as follows:
Google will no longer prevent advertisers from selecting a third party’s trademark
as a keyword. However, in response to a complaint made under our European
policy, we will do a limited investigation as to whether a keyword in combination
with particular ad text is confusing as to the origin of the advertised goods and
services. Under this policy, we will permit certain ads, provided that they are
not confusing as described above. Some examples include, but are not limited
to, the following:
• ads using a trademarked term in a descriptive or generic way, such as not
in reference to the term as a trademark
• ads for competing products or services
• ads for informational sites about a product or service corresponding to the
trademark
• ads for resale of the trademarked goods or services
• ads for the sale of components, replacement parts, or compatible products
corresponding to a trademark.
B Data Snapshot
Table A-1 provides a snapshot of the start of a typical search session. In addition to the
data displayed, we also have timestamp information about when, to the second, each stage
of the search took place.
C Evolution of Search Terms
Table A-2 shows the beginning of two browsing sessions from out data to demonstrate how
search terms evolve during browsing sessions. Table A-3 shows an example how a search
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Table A-1: Snapshot of the Data
ID Base URL Trademark Exact search term Paid Date
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson epson v300 photo No 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson scanner epson No 02aug2010
13 epson.de www.epson.de 02aug2010
13 epson-store.de www.epson-store.de 02aug2010
13 epson-store.de www.epson-store.de 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson epson v300 und v30 No 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson epson v300 und v30 No 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson epson v300 und v30 No 02aug2010
13 epson.de www.typo3.epson.de/index.php 02aug2010
13 epson-ontop.de www.epson-ontop.de 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson epson v300 und v30 No 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/images 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/images epson epson v300 und v30 preis No 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson epson v300 und v30 preis No 02aug2010
13 ebay.de shop.ebay.de/i.html 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search espon epson v300 und v30 preis No 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson epson v300 und v30 preis No 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson epson v300 und v30 preis No 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson epson v300 und v30 preis No 02aug2010
13 ciao.de www.ciao.de/Epson Perfection V30 8036656 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson epson v300 und v30 preis No 02aug2010
13 kioskea.net de.kioskea.net/guide/1201766-epson-perfection-v30 02aug2010
13 google.de www.google.de/search epson epson v300 und v30 preis No 02aug2010
13 dooyoo.de www.dooyoo.de/scanner/epson/flachbettscanner 02aug2010
13 dooyoo.de www.doyoo.de/scanner/epson/flachbettstanner/ra 02aug2010
13 c-nw.de www.c-nw.de/magento/catalogsearch/result/index 02aug2010
session evolves after a searcher has reached the trademark owner’s website.
Table A-2: Evolution of Search Terms in a Browsing Session: Two Examples
Browsing session 1 Browsing session 2
blackberry curve 8520 is unable to connect to internet due to wi fi blackberry storm 2 9520 pay as you go
blackberry hotspot browser blackberry storm 2 vs blackberry bold 9700
blackberry curve 8520 left comfort button keyboard lock blackberry storm 2 9550
blackberry curve 8520 purchased parts blackberry storm 2 pay as you go
blackberry curve 8520 1and 1 cheap blackberry storm 2
blackberry internet service no connection
blackberry curve 8520 is unable to connect to internet due to wi fi
purchased parts blackverry curve 8520
blackverry error message 100
blackberry curve 8520 left comfort button keyboard lock
D Robustness Check: A Shorter Time Window
One potential caveat with our data analysis in Table 2 is that we assume that the coefficient
TriggersAllowed×Google captures only the effect of the change in trademark policy relative
to the other search engines. However, we contrast behavior from right before the policy
change with data a year after the policy change. While the Bing trademark policy has
remained constant during this time (see Section III), there is the potential for other events to
have happened – for example, a significant change in the nature of Google’s search algorithm
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Table A-3: Example of a Browsing Session after Visiting the Trademark Owner’s Website
Start of URL Search term
www.google.fr/search sony ericsson
www.sonyericsson.com/cws/home
www.sonyericsson.com/cws/products/accessories/overview/dcu-60
www.google.fr/search cable sony dcu 60
www.priceminister.com/offer/buy/47420849/Accessoire-Ericsson-Cable-Usb-Dcu-60-Sony-Ericsson-Pour-Sony-Ericsson-W810i-Cables-data.html
www.google.fr/search (search term did not include sony)
www.sonyericsson.com/cws/products/accessories/overview/dcu-60
www.sonyericsson.com/cws/products/accessories/compatiblephones/dcu-60
www.sonyericsson.com/cws/products/mobilephones/overview/hazel
www.sonyericsson.com/cws/products/mobilephones/features/hazel
www.sonyericsson.com/cws/products/accessories/specifications/dcu-60
www.google.fr/search sony ericsson dcu60
www.rueducommerce.fr/Telephonie/Accessoire-Telephone/Cable-Data/SONY-ERICSSON/5434-DCU-60-Cable-Data-SONY-ERICSSON.htm
www.google.fr/search sony ericsson dcu60
www.priceminister.com/offer/buy/16380272/Cable-Data-Usb-Sony-Ericsson-Dcu-60-Cables-data.html
www.google.fr/search sony ericsson dcu60
www.acheter-moins-cher.com/asp/produit100 rwt p 123752.htm
www.google.fr/search sony ericsson dcu60
www.fnac.com/Sony-Ericsson-cable-USB-DCU-60/a1852331/w-4
www.google.fr/search sony ericsson dcu60
www.inmac-wstore.com/produits/sony-ericsson-dcu-60—cable-de-donnees-de-telephone-portable-4008153.aspx
www.google.fr/search sony ericsson dcu60
www.pixmania.com/fr/fr/292463/art/sony-ericsson/cable-usb-dcu-60.html
www.google.fr/search sony ericsson dcu60
www.cordonweb.com/accessoire-01SEMCAB0010-SONY ERICSSON-K750-CABLES DE TRANSFERT DATA.html
www.google.fr/search sony ericsson cable usb dcu 60
www.priceminister.com/offer/buy/17326560/Accessoire-Ericsson-Cable-Usb-Dcu-60-Sony-Ericsson-Pour-Sony-Ericsson-W900i-Cables-data.html
– that could provide an alternative explanation of our results. In addition, the market share
of Google is very high in European search markets, which limits the size of our control
group. Therefore, as a complement to our main analysis, we take advantage of the fact
we do have data on Google searches for September 2010 and use a regression discontinuity
approach. As described by Ho and Rubin 2011, the idea of this approach is that, with a
narrow enough window of time, there is likely to be no unrelated contemporaneous shock
which could otherwise affect the results.
Similar to Busse et al. 2006, we use a narrow period of four weeks around the policy
change (two weeks on either side) and repeat our analysis. We use a straight-forward single-
difference specification. For person i who searches for trademark j in country c at time t:
V isitTMSiteijct = β1TriggersAllowedt +montht + γc + αj + ij
Table A-4 reports the results for the parallel specification to Table 2. Here we find a
negative effect from the policy on visits to the trademark owner’s website. The subsequent
columns echo our earlier analysis where we use proxies to distinguish between navigational
and non-navigational searches. The results are less precisely estimated than our earlier
findings, and the effect sizes are smaller. This could partially be related to advertisers
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taking more time to react than the two weeks after the policy change that we analyze with
the regression discontinuity approach. However, the direction of the effects echo our earlier
findings.
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E Trademarks Analyzed in the Study
Table A-5: Distribution of Trademark Searches in Airline Category
France Germany Total
Air Berlin 22 240 262
Air France 1223 19 1242
American Airlines 26 11 37
British Airways 59 18 77
Cathay Pacific 16 4 20
Delta Airlines 16 18 34
Easyjet 666 98 764
Emirates Airlines 12 4 16
Lufthansa 85 327 412
Ryanair 610 214 824
Singapore Airlines 19 23 42
United Airlines 11 9 20
Total 2765 985 3750
Table A-6: Distribution of Trademark Searches in Auto Category
France Germany Total
Audi 588 799 1387
BMW 651 962 1613
Citroen 1072 172 1244
Fiat 430 283 713
Ford 811 718 1529
Mercedes 438 684 1122
Peugeot 1524 299 1823
Renault 1605 396 2001
Toyota 493 223 716
Volkswagen 411 128 539
Total 8023 4664 12687
Table A-7: Distribution of Trademark Searches in Cell Phone Category
France Germany Total
LG 1040 1254 2294
Nokia 1020 1674 2694
O2 47 1049 1096
Samsung 3442 3730 7172
TMobile 1 320 321
Total 5550 8027 13577
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Table A-8: Distribution of Trademark Searches in Electronics Category
France Germany Total
Blackberry 859 335 1194
Canon 1014 783 1797
Casio 148 256 404
Dell 597 320 917
Electrolux 216 49 265
Epson 437 313 750
HP 1739 1152 2891
iPhone 2667 2088 4755
iPod 657 745 1402
Lenovo 82 195 277
Microsoft 820 846 1666
Motorola 233 365 598
Nintendo 387 596 983
Playstation 167 394 561
Sony 1672 1961 3633
Wii 1236 751 1987
xBox 630 778 1408
Total 13561 11927 25488
Table A-9: Distribution of Trademark Searches in Fashion Category
France Germany Total
Adidas 444 638 1082
Chanel 215 109 324
Esprit 524 379 903
Gillette 45 36 81
Hermes 170 792 962
Hugo Boss 62 92 154
Nike 526 499 1025
Omega 94 110 204
Oreal 39 6 45
Ralph Lauren 90 55 145
Reebok 108 48 156
Revlon 20 11 31
Total 2337 2775 5112
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Table A-10: Distribution of Trademark Searches in Hotel Category
France Germany Total
Best Western 176 130 306
Hilton 151 115 266
Holiday Inn 59 73 132
Ibis 505 102 607
Novotel 219 48 267
Total 1110 468 1578
Table A-11: Distribution of Trademark Searches in Online Category
France Germany Total
CNN 39 24 63
ESPN 32 13 45
Expedia 165 114 279
Lastminute 179 103 282
MSN 2225 821 3046
Opodo 330 85 415
Orbitz 1 1 2
Reuters 32 9 41
Yahoo 2473 743 3216
Total 5476 1913 7389
Table A-12: Distribution of Trademark Searches in Toys and Gifts Category
France Germany Total
Barbie 343 182 525
Disney 1006 281 1287
Interflora 91 32 123
Lego 527 757 1284
Playmobil 336 240 576
Total 2303 1492 3795
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